Critical Realism and Economics by Dow, Sheila
 14 
Published in P Downward (ed.), Applied Economics and the Critical Realist Critique, 
London: Routledge, 2003, 12-26 (pre-publication version). 
 
Chapter 2. Critical Realism and Economics 
Sheila C. Dow 
 
1. Introduction: Economics and Reality 
To many it might seem obvious that economics is concerned with reality. Its Greek roots 
are found in the management of the household. The modern day subject matter is more 
aggregated, but still refers to real actions: buying, selling, employing, working, using up, 
and so on. If it is not concerned with reality, what can it be concerned with? 
 
Most economists would, if questioned1, agree that our subject matter is real in some 
sense, although we shall see that there is some doubt as to how we pin down reality. 
Indeed, once we start studying any real subject matter, collecting evidence and 
constructing theories, we are putting a distance between ourselves as economists and 
reality. This is inevitable. It is the purpose of gathering evidence and of constructing 
theory to identify patterns in reality which allow us to make sense of it and, possibly, 
change it. In that sense all study of real subject matter itself is ‘unrealistic’; it quite 
deliberately differs from an exact representation of reality. 
 
But then what do we make of the relationship between theory and reality? Particularly if 
the ultimate purpose is to propose policies to change reality, and particularly if the change 
involves transformation, we need to understand that reality and how change might impact 
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upon it. But we also need to be sure we understand the relationship between economic 
theory and economic reality.  
The critical realist critique of mainstream economics has brought these important issues 
to the surface of debate. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the contribution which 
critical realism makes to our understanding of economics, as well as our understanding of 
the economy. We start by placing critical realism in context. The issue of the relationship 
between economics and reality is a long-standing one. In the next section we sketch in a 
brief account of how the issue has been addressed in the past. We focus on the most 
recent prior debate in the 1960s and 1970s over the realism of assumptions and the 
subsequent treatment of the issue by the ascendant New Classical Economics in the 
1980s. We devote a separate section to the emergence of a very different approach in the 
1980s and 1990s which raised much more fundamental questions about our access to 
reality and about the accounts we construct about it: the constructivist approach (found in 
the postmodern, rhetoric and sociology of scientific knowledge approaches). 
 
Against this background, we can then set out the critical realist approach. Critical realist 
methodology is derived from a philosophical approach called transcendental realism. We 
discuss this, and other possible philosophical foundations, in the following section. We 
then explore in some detail what the critical realist approach consists of in terms of 
methodology: its use of the concepts of open and closed systems, fallibilism, and the 
abductive method. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of critical realism 
for economics. 
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2. The Realism of Assumptions Debate 
The issue of realism was brought back to the surface of debate in economics fifty years 
ago when Friedman (1953) challenged the idea that there needs to be a direct 
correspondence between theory and reality. He argued that the connection with reality 
should only occur at the point at which predictions from a theory are compared with 
actual outcomes. The assumptions of the theory itself need not correspond to reality, 
indeed he argued that more unrealistic assumptions are likely to yield better predictions. 
Theories were simply instruments for predicting the values of variables.  
 
Friedman himself did not practice what he preached – he proceeded to justify his theories 
in terms of their structure and assumptions. But he had brought to the surface an issue 
which had slid into the background, namely the realism of economic theory.2 This had 
been an important issue over the history of economics, but one which had subsided with 
the burgeoning empirical activity which followed the emergence of modern 
macroeconomics and the construction, eg by the NBER in the US, of large datasets.  
 
The debate sparked off by Friedman had several outcomes which are relevant to the 
subsequent development of critical realism. One outcome was a closer specification of 
the different senses in which assumptions might be unrealistic (see Nagel 1963), which 
suggested that some types of unrealism were more problematic than others. Nagel argued 
that assumptions could be unrealistic in three senses: falsehood, fiction and 
simplification. The issue then is whether any or all of these senses of unrealism lead, as 
Friedman argued, to better prediction. Critical realism takes a particular stand against 
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fictional assumptions in that they preclude any hope of identifying causal mechanisms. 
 
Another outcome was a reflection on the principles which should govern theory 
construction, if they go beyond predictive success. Samuelson (1963) challenged 
Friedman’s advocacy of unrealistic assumptions, arguing that the goal of theory, rather 
than predictive success, should be descriptive content, or empirical validity. The 
difficulty, given that theories inevitably involve some unrealism, lay in establishing 
operational criteria for empirical validity. Samuelson advocated what is known as 
‘conventionalism’ (see Boland 1982 chapter 9), namely recourse to what are 
conventionally accepted as criteria for choosing theories. The result was a rather 
unsatisfactory falling-back on convention as a guide to theory construction. But, 
particularly given the popularity with economists of Popper and Lakatos’s methodology, 
the ultimate criterion remained empirical.3 The way to decide whether a particular 
theoretical development was a good one or not was by empirical testing. 
 
The third outcome was a more general questioning of the purpose of theory, whether it is 
addressed more to prediction or to explanation. There was an understanding that there 
might be a trade-off between the two. Some theories are more suited to one than the 
other; for example, the theory of gravity is better for prediction than explanation, while 
the reverse is true of the theory of evolution. The trade-off is not complete, however – if 
there was a correspondence between the structure of a theory and reality, then there was 
some chance of working out why a theory did not predict successfully. Further, it was 
possible to adapt theory to a change in economic structure (such as a change in exchange 
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rate regime) if there was some correspondence with reality. If however theory were 
treated as a black box, there was no mechanism for taking account of structural change. 
Understanding may therefore provide a better basis for prediction.  
 
New Classical Economics attempted to cut through the problems raised by Friedman’s 
instrumentalism by conflating theory with reality.4 The criterion for theory choice was 
still predictive success, not only for economists, but also for economic agents who were 
depicted as employing exactly the same models. Agents were not understood in reality as 
knowing econometric models, but behaving as if they knew them. This ‘as if’ argument 
had been a common one to justify unrealistic assumptions (like entrepreneurs equating 
marginal cost and marginal revenue) – an example of a fictional assumption. But the 
difference with New Classical economics was that, since rational behaviour (defined in 
the specific way of the axioms of orthodox microeconomics) meant that no opportunity 
was ever left unexploited except by choice, the economy and all its components were 
always in equilibrium. This argument meant a much tighter correspondence between 
theory and reality than in neo-classical theory, where it arises only at the end of a 
disequilibrium process. The problem with the latter view was knowing whether 
observations referred to equilibrium or disequilibrium (for which there was little 
theoretical equipment).  
 
Whether the choice was Friedman’s instrumentalism, New Classical instrumentalism or 
Samuelson’s conventionalism, the tenor of the debate was that there was one best set of 
procedures for economists; it was just a matter of settling the argument as to which set. 
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All agreed that the ultimate criterion for choosing a theory was empirical success 
(understood in econometric terms). This provided the ultimate touchstone of reality.  
 
But there was a general change in intellectual and social climate in the 1980s which 
challenged not only the idea that there was one best procedure for science, but also that 
there was one reality by which to assess it. This encouraged what is known as the 
constructivist approach to economics.  
 
2.1 Constructivism 
Constructivism grew out of the philosophy of science of Kuhn (1962). Like Popper, he 
focused on the significance of scientific community. He offered a descriptive account of 
science which was ‘realistic’ in setting out what scientists actually do, rather than 
prescribing what they ought to do as Popper had done. He addressed the observed fact 
that scientists do not in fact abide by the empirical criterion, but rather continue according 
to criteria internal to that particular scientific community. Reality breaks through when a 
disparity between theory and reality can no longer be sustained, and when there is an 
alternative approach (what he called a paradigm) which appears to fit better with reality.  
A classic example is the Great Depression in the 1930s which could no longer be ignored 
in spite of the inability of economic theory at the time to account for it.  
 
The conventionalism discussed above fits well into this framework. But Kuhn 
demonstrates that it is possible to have a range of paradigms with their own sets of 
conventions, and there is no ultimate set of criteria by which to decide which is best. The 
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empirical criterion is no use in any absolute sense. What constitutes a good empirical test 
may differ from one paradigm to another. But more fundamentally, the view of what 
constitutes reality may differ. Constructivism questions the whole notion of ‘facts’. 
Rather, all we have are subjective perceptions which differ from person to person, and 
over time. Indeed Kuhn’s starting point was the different ways in which language is used, 
effectively making communication – about ‘facts’ or anything else - difficult between 
paradigms. 
 
What then transpired was a dualistic alternation between the view that there is (in 
principle at least) one best way of going about economics, and an ultimate arbiter in the 
facts on the one hand, and the view that there was a multitude of ways of going about 
economics, and no objective means of choosing between them on the other hand. In 
practice economists continued to develop and test theories. Oddly enough, constructivism 
was liberating in that orthodox conventions apparently no longer required justification. 
But the result was an absence of methodological awareness, and an unwillingness to 
discuss the principles by which economics was developing (see Lawson, 1994a). At the 
same time, the particular conventions for orthodox theorising were being opened 
increasingly to question. The constructivist approaches of postmodernism and rhetoric 
played an important part in this questioning, but seemed unable to offer any alternative 
guidance; indeed to have done so would have gone against the conclusion that no 
guidance could be justified. It was in this context that critical realist ideas emerged. 
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3. Critical Realism: Philosophical Foundations   
Critical realism has struck a chord with many economists who are dissatisfied with 
mainstream economic methodology in practice. While much of the support for critical 
realism therefore comes from those who approach it from the direction of practice, it is 
set out very explicitly as an approach which has been developed from the direction of 
philosophy. We consider its philosophical foundations in this section. 
 
Critical realism is founded on transcendental realism, as expounded by Bhaskar (1975). It 
is a philosophical argument as to what the real world must be like, given the nature of 
scientific activity. The crucial distinction is drawn between ontology, which is concerned 
with the nature of reality, and epistemology, which is concerned with the nature of 
knowledge. The object of realist science is to build knowledge about the real world. But 
what can we say about the real world other than in terms of our knowledge of it? Bhaskar 
warns of confusing the two, that is, of committing the epistemic fallacy.  
 
If the real world is something other than our knowledge of it, then it exists at different 
levels, not all of which are directly accessible. Transcendental realism suggests that there 
are three levels: the actual, which we experience directly, the empirical, which is an 
attempt to measure the actual, and the real, to which we do not have direct access. It is at 
the level of the real that causal mechanisms operate; it is the purpose of realist science to 
uncover them. But we can only access the real at the empirical and actual levels; science 
focuses particularly on the empirical as a means of systematising knowledge of the actual.  
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What we can tell about the real from the empirical level depends on the nature of the 
causal mechanisms at the level of the real. The crucial question is whether these causal 
mechanisms operate within a closed system or an open system. A closed system is one in 
which there is both extrinsic closure – no unaccounted for external forces – and intrinsic 
closure – no unaccounted for interrelationships between the parts of the system. Closed 
systems allow for law-like causal mechanisms, which in turn generate empirical 
regularities by which the laws may be identified. An open system, by contrast, is subject 
to outside influences which cannot be anticipated (even as being random, which requires 
some prior knowledge of their nature) and evolution and interaction within the system 
which also cannot be anticipated. Further, causal mechanisms take the form of powers, or 
tendencies, which may or may not be active at any one time, and which when active may 
operate simultaneously and in ways which may counteract each other. 
 
The key argument within transcendental realism is the observed fact that physical science 
proceeds by means of experimentation. An experiment consists of isolating variables 
from outside forces, that is, of fabricating external closure. Drawing conclusions from 
repeated experiments in turn presumes that internal closure is satisfied – that the causal 
mechanism identified in one experiment can be assumed to be repeated in all others. If 
the real world itself constituted a closed system, there would be no need to close it 
artificially in an experiment. The regularities would be present in observed values of 
variables. Therefore the real physical world must be open.  
 
Since it is widely acknowledged to be extremely difficult to construct experiments at all 
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in the social world, then that justifies even more strongly the conclusion that the social 
world is an open system. And indeed there are powerful secondary arguments which 
support this philosophical conclusion: arguments which refer to the creativity of human 
behaviour, the exercise of human agency, the evolution of social institutions, which bear 
out an argument that the real social world must be open.  
 
In summary, then, transcendental realism first puts the spotlight on ontology as being 
prior to, rather than subsumed in, epistemology – the nature of reality is important for 
how we construct knowledge about it, and exists independent of the knowledge we 
construct about it. Second, the observed identification of science with abstraction and 
experimentation shows that there are forces from which science must abstract. Were the 
real world a closed system, this would not be necessary; it would be feasible for science 
to identify all causal mechanisms. 
 
While transcendental realism is the only philosophical route to critical realism identified 
in the critical realist literature (as exemplified by Lawson, 1997), there are other 
philosophical routes. In particular, the philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment offers an 
alternative route (see Dow, 2002).5. Hume had concluded that existence could not be 
demonstrated by reason alone; ontology could not be accessed purely by epistemology, 
understood as reason applied to observation. But, just as Bhaskar observes that science 
proceeds by experiment, Hume observed that science (and conduct more generally) 
proceed on the basis of common sense belief in existence.6 The need for such a basis 
arises from the inaccessibility of the underlying causal mechanisms which generate what 
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we observe and experience. In the terms we have been developing, it is because the world 
is an open system that we cannot hope to identify the underlying causal mechanisms and 
prove by reason and observation their existence. The way in which we then proceed to 
build up knowledge follows from the inaccessibility of the real.  
As far as critical realism is concerned, Hume’s philosophy takes us to the same starting-
point as transcendental realism. No doubt there are other possible philosophical routes. 
But, as far as the implications for economic methodology are concerned, the important 
issues are the same: how to build knowledge about a real world which constitutes an open 
system. We turn in the next section to consider what critical realism implies for economic 
methodology. 
 
4.Critical Realist Methodology 
Critical realists present their arguments as being in support of an approach to economics 
rather than a specific methodology, suggesting that the approach can support a range of 
methodologies (see for example Lawson, 1994b). The approach is one which puts the 
focus on ontology first and epistemology second, with ontology determining 
epistemology. How we construct knowledge depends on the nature of the subject matter.  
 
The critical realist approach helps us to understand existing bodies of work in economics 
by analysing it in terms of ontology and epistemology, for example the work of Menger 
(C Lawson, 1999). But the most powerful use of the approach is to offer a critique of 
mainstream economics (Lawson, 1997). The predominant approach to economics, as 
exemplified by the earlier debate over realism of assumptions, is to construct theories 
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based on fictional assumptions about human choice, and set them in a context which 
implies a given (universal) institutional framework, in order to yield general propositions. 
In practice these propositions may not be tested empirically; rather their truth value is 
assessed in terms of the internal consistency of the theory. Realism then rests on the 
slender thread of the realism of the rationality axioms of orthodox microeconomic theory, 
which we assess by means of introspection. Where propositions are tested empirically, 
they are assessed in relation to a set of facts which is understood to be objective. Testing 
consists of some more or less elaborate identification of event regularities using 
econometric techniques, such that, for example, the rate of inflation correlates with the 
rate of growth of the money supply.  
 
The extent to which any model being tested reflects real causal mechanisms was the focus 
of the realism of assumptions debate. Friedman’s argument was that it was the predictive 
power of the model which was the best test of having captured law-like behaviour. 
Samuelson’s argument was instead that the theory itself should reflect law-like 
behaviour.7 But there was no questioning that identifying law-like behaviour was the 
object of the exercise and that empirical testing of some sort was the definitive basis for 
deciding on the best theory. The New Classical approach went further in suggesting that 
individual agents behave in exactly the same way – that they too are seeking covering 
laws by means of empirical assessment. There has always been an awareness that there 
may be disturbing forces which cause actual variables to deviate from their predicted 
values. But the goal of theory is seen as being to capture as much as possible in the 
theory, such that any remaining disturbances are stochastic. This implies knowledge of 
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the disturbances such that they can be assumed to be random. 
 
The models of mainstream theory then are closed systems. Testing them by reference to 
what are seen as an objective set of facts implies that the real world is also seen as a 
closed system. But the transcendental realist argument is that, if theories abstract (as 
everyone agrees that mainstream theories do) then they must be abstracting from 
something which cannot be captured in the closed system. Attempts are made (for 
example by Becker 1991) to extend the reach of economics as if to minimise what must 
be abstracted from. In particular, critical realists argue that the need to abstract follows 
from the openness of the social world. 
 
The reason for considering above the context in which critical realism arose was not one 
of purely historical interest. Certainly we need to understand the context in order to 
understand the reception which critical realism has encountered. But more important, 
critical realism itself cannot be understood without understanding that context. 
 
The instrumentalism/conventionalism debate in economics was conducted within an 
approach to economics which espoused some form of logical positivism, whereby 
theories are tested not just by their internal logic but ultimately be reference to ‘the facts’. 
Constructivism was a dualistic reaction to logical positivism, challenging the notions of 
singular logic and singular facts. Rather, logic and understanding of facts were seen as 
specific to particular paradigms or, in the extreme versions of constructivism, to 
particular individuals, who even themselves are fragmented. Logic and the facts are then 
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constructs.  
 
Much of the constructivist critique of mainstream economics was similar to the critical 
realist critique, except for the crucial difference that there was a denial of any form of 
benchmark in the form of reality. Effectively the argument was that the social world is an 
open system, and that is why knowledge is socially constructed. There is a contradiction 
here in that appeal does seem to be made to the reality of ‘scientific’ activity, while the 
scope for such appeal is denied. Indeed, just as logical positivism has proved to be 
unsustainable as a basis for methodology (see Caldwell, 1982), so constructivism 
collapses ultimately under a contradiction (see Dow, 2001). The dualism which both 
approaches represent itself reflects closed-system thinking which is at odds with both an 
open-system ontology and an open-system epistemology. 
 
Critical realism then can be seen as the dialectical synthesis which emerges out of the 
thesis of logical positivism and the antithesis of constructivism. As part of a process in 
the development of thought, it carries forward some elements of what has gone before. 
From mainstream economics it takes the idea that empirical regularities tell us something, 
but unlike mainstream economics, these regularities are seen as the starting-point for 
theory rather than the end-point, as prediction. From constructivism, critical realism takes 
the understanding that there is no such thing as objective ‘facts’, only socially-constructed 
knowledge of the world. But the benchmark of a reality independent of our knowledge of 
it gives critical realism more scope for being optimistic that useful knowledge can be 
built up. 
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Because of its open-system ontology, whereby the real is not fully manifest in the 
empirical, critical realism aims to build up knowledge of the mechanisms at work at the 
level of the real, even though we do not have direct access to them. We can never be sure 
that our knowledge is true – theory is fallible – but we can construct arguments in favour 
of one theory over another. There are likely to be several, probably countervailing, 
tendencies at work at any one time. What we pick up at the empirical level may be very 
confusing, not allowing definitive predictions. The aim therefore is to build up sufficient 
knowledge about the different tendencies.  The predictions can be made about the 
operation of the different tendencies, without being able to predict precise values of 
variables. 
 
Critical realist methodology then sets out guidelines as to how that knowledge is built up. 
These guidelines rest on the method of abduction, or retroduction, from regularities 
identified in the economic system. While there is considerable debate about the role (if 
any) of econometrics in critical realist methodology, a matter discussed in some detail in 
the remainder of this volume, this is where the clearest indication of a role for this kind of 
empirical work lies – descriptive statistics. An observed empirical regularity is a clue that 
there may be some tendency at work which has dominated other tendencies, at least for 
the period of observation. This instigates further investigation of a substantive sort.  
 
Further investigation draws on the second key element of critical realist methodology, 
pluralism of method. Since the reality which we are trying to understand is ultimately 
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inaccessible, no one method can generate true knowledge of it. If the real social world is 
an open system, then it is subject to complex internal and external influences. In 
particular, such a system does not lend itself to representation by a singular, deductive 
axiomatic system, since such a system requires the axioms to be true in order for the 
conclusions to be true. Instead, critical realism espouses pluralism, involving recourse to 
a range of methods designed to build up knowledge in different ways, taking different 
starting points.  
 
A starting point involves some closure. Indeed theorising inevitably involves closure of 
some sort (see Chick and Dow 2001, Loasby 2002). Particularly where there is awareness 
of the openness of the economic system, there is a need to invoke closure in order to say 
anything at all other than that everything is complex, interconnected and unknowable. In 
the real social world, open-system uncertainty is contained by the formation of 
institutions (such as the firm) and conventional behaviour (such as posting prices); these 
are closures which allow the system to function. Similarly, economists need to parcel off 
pieces of the system for study in order to try to identify causal mechanisms which can be 
regarded as in some sense separable.  
 
The key difference between the closures of mainstream economics and the closures of 
critical realism is that the former are regarded as universal and fixed while the latter are 
regarded as partial and provisional. In mainstream economics, for example, the money 
supply may be taken as exogenous as a universal principle. In a critical realist analysis, 
the money supply may be taken as given for one particular piece of analysis, for a 
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particular configuration of the banking system, while another investigates the 
mechanisms which generate the money supply for another configuration. Or both types of 
analysis may be applied to the same context, in an effort to build up knowledge from 
different starting-points.  
 
What appears as inconsistency from a closed-system standpoint may be perfectly 
consistent within open-system logic. This logic is akin to Keynes’s ordinary logic which, 
unlike classical logic, addresses (general) circumstances where the truth of axioms cannot 
be established beyond doubt.8 It is not that anything goes – the assumptions made for a 
particular analysis need to be justified in relation to reality. Assumptions in critical realist 
theory may be unrealistic, but only in the sense of abstracting from reality through 
simplification, not in the sense of being fictional.  
 
Theories are developed within the critical realist approach, on the basis of abduction from 
observed provisional regularities (what Lawson calls demi-regs), where observation and 
theorising both rely on a range of methods. Theorising itself involves what Hume would 
refer to as the application of the imagination. The critical realist way of putting it is the 
devising of appropriate metaphors by which to capture a growing understanding of 
underlying causal mechanisms. Here too critical realism can be seen to be drawing 
elements from both mainstream methodology and constructivism in a new way. How 
useful the metaphors are can be judged from their application to new contexts.  
 
There is an underlying presumption that there are sufficient regularities in the social 
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world to allow the building up of theory, however partial and provisional. Were there no 
regularities, knowledge would be impossible. But, as critical realists would argue, so 
would social life be impossible. If nothing else, the institutions and conventions which 
society evolves to allow social life to proceed provide us with some regularities on which 
to base our knowledge. These regularities are the antithesis of the event regularities which 
mainstream economics focuses on in that they are regarded by mainstream economists as 
impediments to the market forces which otherwise generate event regularities. 
 
In summary, then, the critical realist approach is fallibilist – there is no presumption of 
access to truth – and advocates pluralism of method. Both follow from critical realism’s 
philosophical conclusion that the real social world is open. Theories are developed by 
employing metaphors to capture something of the causal mechanisms for which observed 
demi-regularities provide clues. Both theories and demi-regularities inevitably employ 
some form of closure, but closure which is both partial and provisional. The aim of 
building knowledge in this way is to understand the underlying causal mechanisms well 
enough to provide the basis for policy designed to transform society. 
 
Critical realism does not purport to advocate any one methodology – but rather to 
advocate an approach to choosing a particular methodology. Thus for example Lawson 
(1994b) argues that critical realism leaves methodological choice up to economists. In 
particular he draws back from any suggestion that critical realism can contribute to 
discussion about differences between schools of thought. We conclude by considering 
further what it is that critical realism implies for economics. 
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5. Implications for Economics 
The critical realist literature has made a significant contribution to economics not least  
by the strength of the critique of mainstream economics. By setting out a critique at the 
philosophical as well as methodological levels, critical realism has added depth to 
discourse about the source of unease with mainstream economics which had arisen from 
practice. By putting the focus on ontology, critical realism exposes the problems with 
approaches to economics which refer purely to the level of epistemology or present 
contradictory positions with respect to ontology and epistemology.  
 
At the same time critical realism offers a route out of the blind alley created by 
constructivism. The idea that both logic and facts are themselves constructed in a 
fragmented way has been an important part of the critique of the logical positivism of 
mainstream economics. Indeed this idea exposed the problematic nature of mainstream 
economics’s correspondence with reality. But if at the same time the inability to access 
reality is taken as the dualistic opposite of mainstream economics’s empirical access to 
reality, then there is a flip over from demonstrable truth on the one hand to nothing at all 
on the other, as far as economic knowledge is concerned. Constructivist economists in 
fact do construct useful knowledge (with respect to reality) but, as with mainstream 
economics, this knowledge lacks consistent philosophical foundations.  
 
Critical realism instead offers the prospect of building knowledge about the real economy 
which is not demonstrably true, but for which reasoned arguments can be made. This is 
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because the way in which knowledge is built up is consistent with the critical realist 
understanding of the real world as an open system. There are strong implications 
therefore as to the shortcomings of the way knowledge is built up in mainstream 
economics on the one hand, and how non-mainstream economics should proceed on the 
other. 
 
The early literature focused on philosophical foundations and critique. As such it was less 
strong on specific guidance as to how economics should be conducted. This was 
apparently deliberate – critical realism was not intended as a methodological blueprint. 
But it means that much work has to be done in working through the implications of 
critical realism for a number of issues. Three major issues which have already 
commanded attention are first how critical realism relates to different schools of thought 
within non-mainstream economics, second the relative roles of philosophy, methodology 
and practice, and third the role of econometrics. 
 
Lawson (1994b) quite explicitly expresses critical realism as being at a different level 
from the level at which schools of thought are distinguished. There is a strong overlap 
with the concept of mode of thought as developed by Dow (1985). The 
Cartesian/Euclidean mode of thought is based on a closed-system understanding of reality 
while the Babylonian mode of thought is suited to an open-system understanding. But 
theorising, as argued above, requires some closure, albeit provisional and partial. An open 
social system allows for a range of different types of closure. A pluralist methodology 
means different closures for different parts of the analysis.  
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But, unless it is to mean eclecticism, or ‘anything goes’, pluralism itself needs to be 
applied within some limits. Thus paradigms or schools of thought can be understood as 
particular sets of limits on pluralism. These limits stem from the particular ontology of 
each community. For neo-Austrians economic reality is individual-based, for example, 
whereas for Marxists it is class-based, for institutionalists it is institution-based, and so 
on. Different sets of methods are more suited to one school of thought than another – 
questionnaire surveys and case studies are more central to neo-Austrian methodology, for 
example, and time-series analysis is more central to institutionalist methodology. But 
there may be overlap in methods employed by different paradigms. Further, just as 
closure in open-system methodology is partial and provisional, so is the closure within a 
pluralist methodology. Thus schools of thought, and their interrelations, evolve as the 
subject matter evolves. Critical realism provides the foundation for this discussion by 
making clear the starting-point of ontology (see further Dow, 1999). 
 
While ontology as the starting-point for epistemology, methodology and practice is 
central to critical realism, what is less clear is the relation between philosophy more 
generally on the one hand, and practice on the other. The implication of the critical realist 
literature is that philosophy comes first, and therefore that philosophy determines 
practice. But where does the philosophy come from? By critical realist reasoning, 
philosophy is grounded in the real world, of which scientific practice is a part. It is 
through struggling to uncover the causal mechanisms which underlie what we experience 
directly that we become aware of the limitations of mainstream methodology and find 
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ourselves drawn to alternative approaches. As Adam Smith (1795) pointed out, we are 
motivated by our sense of wonder at unexplained phenomena or, in modern language, we 
experience cognitive dissonance when our experience does not accord with our theories. 
Similarly, we experience cognitive dissonance when we are dissatisfied with the 
mainstream approach to economics, but not when we adopt an approach which is 
designed to uncover reality as we believe it to be.  
 
Critical realist philosophy thus constitutes an application of reason to how we understand 
the world in order to build knowledge about it. But as our knowledge builds, we need to 
be open to the possibility that our philosophy too may evolve. Thus while critical realist 
philosophy is applied in a ‘top-down’ way, it has itself been developed in a ‘bottom-up’ 
way. A challenge which lies ahead is to treat critical realist philosophy itself as an open 
system, open to further lessons learned from practice. 
 
A particularly controversial element of practice is econometrics. It has been forcefully 
argued, notably by Lawson (1997), that econometric techniques lack any justification 
when applied to an open social system, since they require closure in the aspect of the real 
world under study. But the argument is building force that econometrics, thoughtfully 
applied, might be a useful descriptive tool alongside other methods for building 
knowledge (see for example Downward 2002, and subsequent chapters in this volume). 
Further, since econometrics is not a homogenous set of techniques, some techniques may 
find more justification than others. In his critique of Tinbergen, for example, Keynes 
denied the general applicability of econometrics, and in particular general claims as to the 
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econometric testability of theories, but did not rule out the possibility that it might have 
some application (see for example Lawson 1985 and Pesaran and Smith 1985). The 
important point was that the onus was on the econometrician to justify assuming a 
sufficient degree of closure in reality to warrant application of a closed-system 
econometric model, and to accept limitations on how the results might be used. This is an 
area where practice can be considered in arguments about critical realist philosophy, such 
that the development at the philosophical level and the level of practice interact. Indeed, it 
is precisely this theme which is addressed in subsequent chapters. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Critical realism represents an important development in our thinking about the 
philosophical foundations for economics, and their implications for methodology and 
practice. It has echoes in eighteenth century debate about science which grappled with 
issues concerning the best way to build up knowledge about the real world as the basis for 
changing that world. But as it developed science took on a life of its own such that its 
relationship with reality became less of a focus for attention and accordingly more 
tenuous. Critical realism has refocused our attention on an independent reality and what is 
required to build knowledge about it in order to change it. 
 
As such critical realism embodies a powerful critique of mainstream economic 
methodology. At the same time it presents philosophical foundations for non-mainstream 
economics in the form of a pluralist, fallibilist approach. The important agenda would 
now appear to be to build on these foundations more explicit direct applications of critical 
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realism to demonstrate the practical difference which such an approach makes. Such 
applications in turn will provide material to be fed back to the philosophical level. The 
philosophy stems from an understanding of social reality as an open system. But as we 
build up knowledge of particular aspects of that open system, there is scope for further 
developing the philosophical foundations. A particular case in point is the issue of the 
role of econometrics, which philosophical argument seemed to rule out, but practice 
suggests a modification to that position.  
 
Finally there is considerable scope for further definition of non-mainstream schools of 
thought in terms of their different types of open-system ontology. At all levels – reality, 
observation, theory, methodology and philosophy – openness has to involve some 
(partial, provisional) segmentation in order to be functional. Mapping out the territory 
within open systems is the next important challenge. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 The question is rarely raised explicitly, except by critical realists. 
2 In philosophical terms, realism is a multi-faceted concept, treated differently in different contexts; see 
Maki (1998). 
3 See Dow (2002, chapter 6) for a fuller discussion of Popper and Lakatos’s philosophy of science as it 
relates to economics. 
4 This was particularly true of Sargent; see Sent (1998) 
5 It is ironic, and potentially rather confusing, to argue that Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, particularly 
that of Hume, should provide an alternative route to critical realism, since Bhaskar in particular sees the 
Scottish Enlightenment as embodying the epistemic fallacy, and Hume as having inspired an empiricism 
based on observed event regularities. What is involved here is two very different interpretations of Hume 
and the Scottish Enlightenment. 
6 The term ‘common sense’ here refers to common sense philosophy; see Comim (2002). 
7 What is meant by reflecting nature is crucial. Samuelson’s correspondence principle was an attempt to 
justify the assumption that the dynamic processes underpinning comparative statics were stable; see Blaug 
(1980: chapter 4). 
8 Lawson (1995) explicitly develops the commonality between critical realism and Keynes’s philosophy. 
